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Abstract
We consider how the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) was affected by R&D, 
trade, information and communication technology, and catching-up for the period 
from 1990 to 2006. Our contributions are: Firstly, to decompose TFP growth into 
two distinct measures for catching-up and for innovation using the Malmquist index; 
secondly, to update related investigations. Summarizing our findings, catching-up 
effects are statistically important, whereas frontier shifts tend to be smaller with 
increasing distance to the frontier, and large differences exist and persist between 
sectors and countries.
Keywords Productivity · Convergence · Malmquist index · R&D · Trade · ICT
1 Introduction
Economic growth is one of the great miracles of human development and of rather 
recent origin. Productivity is considered as the ‘ultimate engine of growth in the 
global economy’ (OECD 2015) and belongs to those ‘two really great mysteries of 
economics’ (Krugman 1994a, b). Historically, continuous growth is a rather recent 
phenomenon that has emerged only after the industrial revolution. The ongoing 
growth of the Chinese economy and the expansion of the Asian Tigers are recent 
examples of this miracle (see Lucas 1993).
Endogenous growth models (e.g., see Romer 1990) aim at explaining the Solow 
(1956) residual because capital accumulation cannot explain observed growth. 
They build on spillovers from capital, public goods, R&D, learning by doing, etc. 
in order to counter the law of diminishing returns on capital. North (1989) and later 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) emphasize the role of institutions. All these theo-
ries, however, fail to explain how the industrial revolution turned economies that 
had been stagnant for millennia (even after the agrarian revolution 8000 BC) into 
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forever-growing ones, and Clark (2009) offers an evolutionary explanation leading 
to more patience (in England). Observing Europe’s industrialization in the 18th and 
19th century, Gerschenkron (1962) introduced the idea of catching-up that ‘eco-
nomic backwardness on the eve of [a country’s] industrialization’ has had a per-
sistent effect on the ensuing development. Hence, late-coming, backward countries 
experienced a ‘sudden great spurt’ of manufacturing output, high growth rates, dis-
tinctive bigger plants and enterprises, etc., or have ‘a culture conducive to innova-
tion, knowledge creation, and entrepreneurship’ according to Özak (2018) for coun-
tries ‘relatively more distant from the frontiers throughout the last two millennia’.
Our investigation quantifies how total factor productivity (TFP) growth is affected 
by factors such as R&D, trade, and catching up based on a sample of 12 countries and 
11 manufacturing industries from 1990 to 2006. Our contributions are: First, updat-
ing the widely quoted work of Griffith et al. (2004); second, introducing a different 
and nonparametric measure of TFP growth. Third, to decompose TFP growth into one 
for catching-up (moving closer to efficient frontier) and one for innovation (shifts of 
the efficient frontier) using the Malmquist index. Fourth, we address the role of infor-
mation and communication technology (ICT) in TFP growth, which is ignored, quite 
surprisingly, in Griffith et al. (2004) and follow-ups. Gordon (2016) sees recent ICT 
advances as not comparable to the breakthroughs hundred years ago (electricity, com-
bustion engine, telegraph, etc.). Solow’s remark that ‘you can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics’ (cf. Jorgenson et al. 2008) has become 
famous as the computer productivity paradox. However, Acemoglu et al. (2014) argue 
the opposite: ‘computers are now everywhere in our productivity statistics’.
The most important of our findings is that large differences in productivity exist 
across countries, industries and time. Depending on time lags, R&D intensities 
affect both components; by contrast, imports have a weak positive impact on catch-
ing up but a negative one on innovation. Furthermore, an interaction of these two 
factors with the distance to the frontier does not add explanatory power. We find 
some indications that investment into information and communication technology 
accelerates productivity growth for an industry that occupies a larger distance from 
the technology frontier. In summary, catching-up effects are statistically important, 
frontier shifts tend to be smaller with increasing distance to the frontier, and many 
of our findings differ from those in Griffith et al. (2004).
After a literature review, we outline our approach, data envelopment analysis and 
the Malmquist index, and the data in Sect. 3 including plots of (relative) productiv-
ity in different industries and countries across time based on the data envelopment 
analysis. The estimation results are given in Sect. 4 and their robustness is checked 
in Sect. 5. An Appendix documents additional robustness checks and plots TFP at 
country and industry levels.
2  Literature review
Since research and development is a major source for innovation and technological 
progress, many authors focus on linking R&D and productivity. This is also a key 
topic on the political agenda, e.g., in the Horizon 2020 framework of the European 
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Union. Coe and Helpman (1995; see also the updated version by Coe et al. 2009) 
add institutional variables (such as ease of doing business, patent protection and 
common versus statuary law) in order to empirically assess cross-country spillover 
effects of R&D knowledge. The intuition is that productivity gains through R&D do 
not depend exclusively on the domestic stock of knowledge but also on foreign R&D 
efforts. For a sample of 22 highly developed countries, they could not only establish 
a positive link between domestic R&D efforts and productivity, but most notably a 
parallel link for foreign R&D. Furthermore, trade openness increases the impact of 
foreign R&D spillovers and foreign R&D is more important in smaller countries.
Since Adam Smith and David Ricardo there has been a long tradition of viewing 
trade as beneficial. In particular, imports enable technology transfer for two reasons: 
First, imports enhance productivity simply by learning from others. Second, import-
ing goods (such as machines) may itself enhance production and positively affect 
technological capabilities. This effect can be seen in countries suffering from sanc-
tions on high tech goods such as Iran for decades and Russia currently.1 Consider-
ing a panel of 75 developing and industrialized countries, Connolly (2003) shows 
that the import of high-technology goods positively affects domestic imitation and 
innovation. However, Keller (1998) is skeptical about the trade-induced R&D spillo-
vers of Coe and Helpman (1995). Keller and Yeaple (2009) suggest that (for US 
manufacturing industries) technological spillovers can be attributed to foreign direct 
investment rather than to imports. However, Madsen (2007) finds that no less than 
93% of TFP growth was the result of international transmission of R&D knowledge 
through the import channel based on estimates and simulations for 16 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1870 to 2004. Similarly, the currently contested NAFTA led 
to a dramatic increase in productivity and Melitz and Trefler (2012) conclude “…. 
Canadian manufacturing labor productivity rose by 13.8 percent [NAFTA started 
in 1994]. The idea that a single government policy could raise productivity by such 
a large amount and in such a short time-span is truly remarkable.” Souare (2013) 
finds, also in the context of Canadian manufacturing, a robust role for international 
trade, FDI and R&D in explaining TFP growth. The comprehensive study (138 
countries) by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) finds strong evidence of a causal ‘effect of 
trade on productivity across countries’. Bloom et al. (2016) find that competition due 
to Chinese imports increased technical change (around 14% of European technology 
upgrading 2000–7). Ding et al. (2016) present a similar result for Chinese manufac-
turing industries, where competition pressure from imports led to rapid technologi-
cal upgrading that accelerated in firms and industries close to the world frontier.
It is somewhat surprising that the link between exports and total factor productiv-
ity (mainly studied at the firm level) is at best weak. There is an almost unanimous 
agreement that export is essentially a consequence of productivity growth and not 
the other way round. For example, in a firm-level study on Colombia, Mexico and 
Morocco, Clerides et al. (1998) conclude that ‘the well-documented positive associ-
ation between exporting and efficiency is explained by the self-selection of the more 
1 Hufbauer et al. (2007) find that only 34% of economic sanctions between 1914 and 2006 were actually 
effective.
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efficient firms into the export market’. A decade earlier, Kunst and Marin (1989) find 
‘no (Granger) causal link from exports to productivity’, for Austria. Bernard et al. 
(2007) document how rare, different and more efficient the exporting firms are.
The share of capital invested in ICT goods (which typically refers to computer 
hardware, software or telecommunication devices) has rapidly increased during the 
last decades, according to Nordhaus (2007) from 0.1% (in 1945) to 2.3% (in 2000) 
for the U.S. Investment in ICT can be seen as a form of capital deepening that can 
make labor more productive. Jorgenson et  al. (2008) identify computer and tele-
communication as the driving force ‘behind the acceleration of labor productivity 
growth’ in the U.S. from 1995 to 2000. However, there is so far little empirical evi-
dence of linking ICT capital to total factor productivity. Stiroh (2002) finds no sig-
nificant positive impact of ICT capital on TFP growth but a strong positive impact 
on average labor productivity (data from 20 US manufacturing industries from 1984 
to 1999). Venturini (2015) extends Coe and Helpman (1995) and finds that ICT 
capital, like R&D, is ‘an important source of TFP spillovers’ that does not ‘overlap 
with productivity spillovers from R&D carried out in the underlying technological 
fields’. The survey of Cardona et al. (2013) finds that the majority of studies report 
a positive and significant impact of ICT on productivity; a similar effect is found by 
Lehr and Lichtenberg (1998) for federal agencies. Kuusi (2015), following a theo-
retical exposition, establishes a leader–follower relationship between US and EU-15 
(using DEA techniques). Pieri, Vecchi and Venturini (2017) find that ICT has been 
effective in reducing inefficiency and in generating inter-industry spillovers (using a 
translog stochastic frontier). Summarizing, the recent literature offers some evidence 
why especially backward industries could benefit from importing ICT capital and 
thereby implicitly from foreign know how.
This paper follows the approach pioneered by Griffith et al. (2004) who analyzed 
15 manufacturing industries over 16 years for 12 OECD countries. Using TFP levels 
obtained from the superlative index-number methodology of Caves et  al. (1982a), 
the major findings are: The hypothesis of catching-up is confirmed, and high invest-
ment in R&D leads to specifically fast catching-up. By contrast, imports did not 
affect the rate of TFP growth, but a larger trade share in total output seems to facili-
tate the process of convergence and to promote technology transfer. Human capital, 
measured by the percentage share of higher educated people, has positive and sig-
nificant effects on productivity growth as well as on the cross-country convergence 
of industries.
Others have used the data set too. Notably Acemoglu et al. (2006) confirm that 
R&D intensities increase closer to the frontier such that R&D is more important 
for technology leaders. Similar approaches were applied in follow-up studies, e.g. in 
Cameron et al. (2005) to US and UK and 14 manufacturing industries from 1971 to 
1992. They find a direct influence of R&D on TFP, but no indication on catching-up. 
For imports (from the world), they are unable to establish a direct effect, only a posi-
tive interaction term. Higher education had no significant influence on TFP growth. 
Cameron et al. (2005) conclude that ‘R&D affects rates of UK productivity growth 
through innovation, while international trade facilitates the transfer of technology’.
Khan (2006) investigates the TFP gap between the United States and France for 
14 manufacturing industries from 1980 to 2002. In contrast to previous studies, trade 
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affects productivity directly, especially for imports from Germany, the UK and the US. 
The explanation is that import from technologically advanced countries might be espe-
cially important for countries that are already comparably close to the frontier. Bour-
nakis (2012) does the same for Greek and German manufacturing industries (17 sec-
tors, 1980–2003). While the above two-country case studies estimate a period between 
five and ten years to close half of the TFP gap with the USA, Bournakis reports that 
‘a typical Greek manufacturing industry needs about 40 years to close half the gap in 
technical efficiency that separates it from its German counterpart.’ Bureaucracy and 
bad institutions may hinder technology transfer from more advanced countries.
While the two-country studies are based on around 300 observations, Mc Morrow 
et al. (2010) employ again a large data set (nine EU countries and the United States, 
28 different industries from 1980 to 2004) with the objectives to explore the EU–US 
total factor productivity gap, to consider services and to focus on the importance 
of ICT for TFP growth. US ICT producers—as the main contributor of the EU–US 
gap—were benefitting more from R&D spillovers than EU countries. Furthermore, 
‘industries with higher R&D expenditures and higher adoption rates for ICT-inten-
sive technologies appear to exhibit higher TFP growth rates’. As far as the manufac-
turing sector was concerned, their models show neither a significant impact of ICT 
capital on TFP growth nor significant interactions. Another recent and comprehen-
sive contribution by Andrews et al. (2016) focuses on labor productivity and finds 
divergence rather than catching-up even after controlling for confounding factors.
3  Empirical application
We apply the DEA-like Malmquist index approach of Färe et al. (1994) whose TFP 
decomposition admits a distinction between two particular components of produc-
tivity growth: the changes of technical efficiency (catching-up) and technological 
progress (innovation). This differentiation may reduce some of the ambiguities 
from previous studies. For example, all quoted papers argue that R&D intensities 
will affect rates of innovation. This conclusion is, however, not justified as such an 
effect may be due to catching-up in a cross-country regression. Similarly, backward 
entities benefit from higher import intensities either by triggering competition that 
improves efficiency or by importing better technology.
3.1  Data
The EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts ‘contain industry-level meas-
ures of output, inputs and productivity for 25 European countries, Japan and the US 
for the period from 1970 onwards’. The well-kept KLEMS data sets have been used 
in other cross-country studies, e.g., in Mc Morrow et al. (2010), and in Honma and 
Hu (2014) for total factor energy efficiency. We use the Release of November 2009 
(ultimately updated in March 2011) that is based on a sample of 12 countries and of 
all 11 manufacturing industries (see our Tables 1 and 2) such that their sum equals 
the KLEMS sub-category of ‘Total manufacturing’. The period 1990–2006 was 
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chosen, because we wanted to exclude the economic turmoil due to the financial cri-
sis that started in 2007. Countries, industries and the variables including their data 
source are summarized in Tables 1, 2, 3.
3.2  Data Envelopment Analysis
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which was introduced in Charnes et al. (1978), 
generates a non-parametric piecewise surface that allows assessing the levels of 
efficiency without the need to set weights like for conventional index numbers and 
without the need for price data. The productivity of a specific entity (θ) is quantified 
by 1 minus the distance to the frontier. Our application fulfills the criterion of ‘at 
least three times as many observations as dimensions’ (see Schiersch et al. 2015, p. 
5944).
DEAs may exaggerate efficiency because not all inefficiencies are eliminated 
even for those at the frontier. Growiec (2012) addresses this upward bias of DEA 
by adding US states data to the OECD country level data. Different from stochastic 
Table 1  Decision making units, 










11 UK United Kingdom
12 USA United States of America
Table 2  Sectors (j = 1,…, 11)
Codes refer to ISIC3
1 15–16 FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO
2 17–19 TEXTILES, TEXTILE, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR
3 20 WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK
4 21–22 PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS
5 23–25 CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL
6 26 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL
7 27–28 BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL
8 29 MACHINERY, NEC
9 30–33 ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT
10 34–35 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
11 36–37 MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING
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frontier approaches, our DEA approach does require neither a priori functional 
specification of the technology, nor any assumptions concerning the distribution of 
the inefficiency terms. Compared to index number approaches, no price information 
(only input and output quantities) is required. A drawback of the DEA based frontier 
approach is its ignorance of noise and its requirement for strongly balanced panel 
data for the TFP estimation (the quality of EU KLEMS data mitigates this problem). 
Coelli et al. (2005, pp 311–314) summarizes the pros and cons and finds that DEA 
does best by counting the advantages of each method. Van Biesebroeck (2007) also 
compares the different approaches and finds that ‘DEA excels when technology is 
heterogeneous’ as is likely for a cross country comparison based on a necessarily 
aggregate level. Applying different methods to EU KLEMS data, Giraleas (2013) 
finds that ‘DEA (and growth accounting) are likely to be most accurate estimates 
of technical inefficiency.’ De Loecker and Van Biesebroeck (2016) emphasizes the 
role of market power, which is reduced with increased competition from imports, if 
evaluating (revenue based) TFP.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of relative TFP from 1989 until 2006 for all 12 
DMUs and for total manufacturing (derived by an input-oriented, constant-returns-
to-scale DEA methodology); the development of each industrial sector in each coun-
try is shown in the Appendix. Although the countries can be identified (by colors), 
this is not the major point of Fig. 1. Instead, the important and most striking obser-
vations are: First, the large differences in efficiencies with low efficiencies at 50% 
and in some sectors even as low as 20% (e.g., in basic metals); second, the average 
Table 3  Variables and data sources
Labor is measured by the total hours worked by employed persons (KLEMS variable: H_EMP), 
and is denoted in millions of hours
Capital is capital compensation (KLEMS variable: CAP) in millions of local currency. It was 
converted to 1995 prices and thus deflated on the basis of the volume index (KLEMS variable: 
CAP_QI)
Value added (KLEMS variable: VA) is the gross value added at current basic prices in millions of 
local currency. It was transformed into 1995 prices by the corresponding price index (KLEMS 
Variable: VA_P). As in Griffith et al. (2004) and Cameron et al. (2005), local currencies are 
transformed to US dollars according to ‘Purchasing Power Parities for GDP’ of corresponding 
years (taken from the OECD Database: ‘National Accounts: PPPs and exchange rates’)
R&D intensities established by ‘STAN Indicators: R&D intensity using value added’
Trade. Industry-level data for imports and exports—from origin or destination of the whole 
world—were taken from the ‘STAN Database for Structural Analysis: Imports of goods at current 
prices’. Originally expressed in millions of local currency, trade data was normalized by gross 
output at current basic prices (KLEMS variable: GO)
M Imports, computed as the variable Trade above
ICT = the percentage of total capital assigned to information and communication technology, was 
again taken from KLEMS (Variable: CAPIT)
TFPCH estimates the growth in total factor productivity based on Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) 
again taken from KLEMS (Variable: TFPva_I). For comparisons the according data is also down-
loaded (and transformed to growth rates), see Table 17 in the Appendix
TFPGAP denotes the gap relative to the efficient international competitor(s), which is based on the 
DEA approach explained below
TECHCH captures technological progress, i.e., shifts of the efficient frontier
EFFCH reflects movements towards the efficient frontier. Together with TECHCH, it is determined 
by a decomposition of TFPCH using the Malmquist index
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distance from the frontier as well as the variance of TFPs has rather increased than 
decreased over time. Therefore, no overall catching up is observable at this level 
during 1990–2006.
D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc.
17t19: Tex
les 20: Wood


























































Fig. 1  DEA-based TFP Levels
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3.3  Malmquist Index and Decomposition
Total factor productivity shows huge fluctuations as can be seen from Fig. 1. TFP indices 
should reflect these changes. Caves et al. (1982b) proposed a particular TFP index and 
named it Malmquist index referring to Sten Malmquist (1917–2004), who had already 
in the 1950s applied a distance function methodology. Malmquist index approaches are 
characterized as distance functions that assess TFP changes between two points in time. 
Färe et al. (1994) propose an approach that allows decomposing TFP changes into dif-
ferent sub-components based on DEA. Our objective is to split total factor productiv-
ity changes into (i) a catching-up term (EFFCH) that reflects movements towards the 
efficient frontier, and (ii) a frontier shift (TECHCH) capturing technological progress. 
This accounts for the demand for a decomposition, ‘the ability to disentangle produc-
tivity changes into components associated with these factors may prove to be the most 
important application of these indexes’, according to Grosskopf (2003, p. 464).
Our empirical application uses the input-oriented approach,2 see Lee and Leem 
(2011). Inputs are labour and capital—whereas output is value added (for details and 
29: Machinery n.e.c. 30t33: Electrical and op	cal eq.






























Fig. 1  (continued)
2 Given constant returns to scale, input- and output-oriented approaches will (essentially) return the 
same results.
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definitions, see Table 3). Total factor productivity change (TFPCH) of a production 
unit between two periods, t and t + 1, is estimated by the Malmquist Index,
where Et
I
(.) is the input-oriented distance function (relative to production technology 
of period t) and the subscript I indicates the input orientation; x is a vector of (two) 
inputs, and y a scalar output corresponding to the periods t and respectively t + 1. 
Using the production technology of t + 1 as reference, one can alternatively compute 
the change from:
Since both results are not identical (except for Hicks neutrality), Caves et al. (1982b) 
propose the geometric mean for their definition of the Malmquist Productivity Index,
A value greater than 1 indicates TFP growth between two periods: in the second 
period, the same quantity of input generates more output. By contrast, a decline of 
TFP would result in TFPCH < 1.
Following Färe et al. (1994) allows for splitting TFPCH into two components:
Or
EFFCH > 1 indicates a movement closer to the frontier, and < 1 of falling behind. 
Thus, EFFCH is a catching-up term that refers to productivity change through 
more efficient use of (existing) production technology. The remaining residual part 
TECHCH is the ‘geometric mean of the shift in technology between two periods’,3 
and can be interpreted as innovation; again: a value greater than 1 indicates an 
increase, while a value less than 1 denotes a decline. Our TFP growth rates based 
on the Malmquist Index are highly correlated with the rates reported in KLEMS 
(around 0.9 and higher, see Table 17 in Appendix) which validates our approach.
Our DEA assessments are always done ‘within’ specific sectors and not across 
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3 Coelli et al. (2005), p. 70.
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solely the manufacturing sector on a highly stylized and aggregated level with 
two inputs and one output. We follow very closely the recommended adjustments 
(such as adjustments for PPP) from the literature to achieve a valid comparison. 
And last but not least our TFP growth estimates (based on the Malmquist-type 
productivity Index) are confirmed by their high correlation with the TFP growth 
estimates published by KLEMS (and derived from a different methodology), see 
Table 20 in Appendix.
Table 4 summarizes the means of the key, albeit relative and sector specific, 
variables (including total manufacturing) and their standard deviations. This 
provides a first and rough overview, how much one can infer at this level and 
how much the following and more subtle analysis (in our case a panel regression 
design) modifies them. Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 highlight 
substantial differences and variations in efficiencies across countries and sectors 
although our sample consists of highly industrialized countries only.
Table 4  Selected variables—means (and standard deviations)
Malmquist-based TFPCH. EFFCH and TECHCH are transformed into percentages. R&D = R&D 
expenses/Value Added; M = Imports normalized by Gross Output; ICT = ICT/Non-ICT Capital. θ is the 
level of technical efficiency according to DEA (ranging from 0 to 1); ICT shares of the ICT producing 
sector ‘Electrical and optical equipment’ (30–33) are (occasionally) above 90% and thus excluded
TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH R&D M ICT θ
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4  Estimation
We use a three-dimensional panel regression design with country, industry and 
time fixed effects in order to explain productivity growth rates. This follows Griffith 
et al. (2004) and the later follow ups. TFP measures are regressed on time-lagged 
explanatory variables. The Malmquist index-based TFPCH is decomposed in the 
components EFFCH and TECHCH, which allows for studying the impact of differ-
ent independent variables on the TFP growth rate in more detail, aggregate and in 
its components. All three variables on the left-hand side of the regressions, namely 
TFPCH, EFFCH and TECHCH, are growth rates or shares and thus stationary. The 
main results are presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 and complementary fittings are given 
in the Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 in the Appendix.
The setup of the crucial explanatory variable TFPGAP requires a modification of 
the standard DEA that permits multiple to be efficient. θ denotes the level of tech-
nical efficiency following Charnes et  al. (1978), often abbreviated as CCR DEA 
model after Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes. We use (2 − θ) to measure the distance to 
the frontier, because 1 − θ = 0 for all countries at the frontier. Of course moving from 
0 to 1 changes nothing of substance in the variable TFPGAP but matters for the 
interactions, e.g., R&D* TFPGAP = R&D instead of 0 for all countries at the fron-
tier if using (1 − θ) for the gap.
The puzzling feature of the sector electrical and optical equipment as the 
one with the highest TFP growth but the lowest average efficiency is due to the 
divergence between frontier countries and laggards as documented in the appen-
dix; Mc Morrow et al. (2010) makes a similar observation.
The sector ‘electrical and optical equipment’ that produces ICT goods is an 
extreme outlier with its very high share of ICT capital (e.g., above 99% in the 
Netherlands compared with around 5% for chemicals), and it is the sector with 
the highest TFP growth during our observation period (4.8% per annum but the 
lowest average efficiency, θ = 0.7 in the last column in Table 4). Therefore, it is 
excluded in the regressions that include ICT on the right-hand side.
4.1  Catching‑up
The catching-up terms, the coefficients of  TFGAPt−1, are all significant at the 
1% level for all three endogenous variables (TFPCH, EFFCH and TECHCH). 
Moreover, they are robust because of similar estimated values across the differ-
ent variables included on the right hand sides; this extends to the robustness tests 
in the Appendix (with only one exception, Table  14). Other things equal, the 
further a production unit is behind the frontier in period t − 1, the bigger the rate 
of TFPCH at time t. Furthermore and even showing larger coefficients, the same 
relationship holds for EFFCH, indicating that backward industries will benefit 
specifically from catching-up. This supports the importance of catching-up and 
of our motivating hypothesis based on Gerschenkron (1962) and the findings in 
Griffith et al. (2004). However, the opposite holds for TECHCH: the further an 
industry is behind the frontier, the smaller is the change through technological 
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progress. Laggards experience smaller frontier shifts than leaders and thus lose 
on the technological front. This is significant at the 1% level (except at 10% only 
in one case in Table 7).
4.2  R&D
One- and two-year lags of the R&D expenses are significantly increasing TFPCH at 
5% and 1% levels, Table 5, columns 1 and 2. However, the corresponding interaction 
terms are significantly negative. Therefore, the result in Griffith et al. (2004) of dis-
proportionally higher return for R&D the further an industry is behind the frontier 
must be refuted; already Cameron et al. (2005), Khan (2006), and Bournakis (2012) 
failed to reproduce those findings.
For EFFCH we find (independent from their specific TFPGAP) a moderately sig-
nificant positive effect of catching-up rates for one-year time lags of R&D intensi-
ties, see Table 6, column 1. Industries benefit from recent R&D expenses by moving 
closer to the frontier. However, due to the corresponding negative interaction terms, 
such a positive impact on catching-up does not have the same implications as sug-
gested by Griffith et al. (2004, p. 883) who argued that ‘the further a country lies 
behind the technological frontier, the greater the potential for R&D to increase TFP 
growth’.
Innovation rates have a positive effect on frontier shifts (TECHCH) for two-
year lags (Table 7, column 2, the coefficient of R&Di j t−2 is significant at a 5% 
level). The three-years lagged R&D variable has also a significant positive effect 
on TECHCH, but loses its significance on TFPCH (see Appendix Tables 12 and 
14, column 4). Again, the interaction terms are negative and even significantly in 
one case (Table 7, column 5).
Our decomposition approach yields new and plausible insights into how R&D 
efforts translate into productivity gains over time. While one-year lags affect the 
distance to the frontier (and will push the level of technical efficiency relative 
to the frontier), two- and three-year lags result in frontier-shifts, which capture 
the nature of scientific evolution, characterized by delays, perhaps more subtly 
than in previous studies. The findings, especially concerning TECHCH, are con-
sistent with endogenous growth theory, which explains technological change by 
research and development. Nevertheless, for our sample of highly industrialized 
countries, interaction of high R&D with the distance from the frontier does not 
lead to higher growth rates.
4.3  Trade/import
Griffith et  al. (2004), using imports from the frontier country, and Cameron et  al. 
(2005), using imports from the whole world, find moderately positive effects for 
trade and for trade-related interaction terms. Since the DEA approach may locate 
multiple countries at the frontier, we consider imports from the rest of the world 
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(normalized by gross output). These import shares as well as the corresponding 
interaction terms are both insignificant for TFPCH (Table 5, and column 3).
However, at our level of decomposition, trade may have a beneficial role for 
catching-up. First, imports positively affect EFFCH (Table 6, column 3), statistically 
significant at a 10% level. This level of significance also holds in the enlarged model 
in column 5 (of Table 6). This suggests that importing tends to help industries by 
reducing their distance to the frontier. However, this positive effect of imports is 
countered by the negative coefficient if combined with TFPGAP.
At the level of TECHCH, higher import shares (of gross output) have a negative 
impact (significant at 1%) on frontier shifts. Thus importing seems to lower domes-
tic innovation. However, given a sufficiently large distance from the frontier, imports 
can trigger positive frontier shifts (TECHCH); this effect is significant at a 1% level, 
see Table  7, columns 3 and 5.4 This suggests a threshold: industries close to the 
frontier do not benefit from imports but those at sufficient distance benefit in terms 
of catching up for frontier shifts (TECHCH).
Combining these observations suggests that importing is not effective for catch-
ing-up (EFFCH) in industries that are very much behind the frontier (i.e., TFPGAP 
is large), but beneficial for frontier shifts (TECHCH). Such a shift might result from 
importing up-to-date and thus expensive production technologies. Summarizing, the 
moderate but significant impact of imports on EFFCH (and the positive interaction 
term for TECHCH) supports previous findings that imports play at least some role in 
accelerating technology transfer. If imports are replaced by the entire trade volume 
of an industry—see Tables 12, 13, 14 in the Appendix—we find similar but smaller 
coefficients. In this case, the aforementioned impact on EFFCH becomes stronger 
and significant at a 1% level.
4.4  ICT
Similar to Mc Morrow et al. (2010, p. 173, Column 7), a one-year time lag of the 
ICT-capital shares shows no significant impact on TFPCH (Table 5, column 4). The 
same holds for interaction terms and each TFP component. Quite surprisingly, but 
consistent with Venturini (2015), considering longer delays, as presented in Appen-
dix Tables 9, 10, 11, yields some indications for ICT-related spillover effects.
As mentioned, the sector electrical and optical equipment is excluded from the 
sample in the regressions that include ICT on the right hand side. While there is once 
more no indication that ICT itself is a genuine driver for total factor productivity, we 
find some positive effects if adding interaction terms. Four-year lagged ICT-interac-
tion terms are strongly affecting TFPCH and EFFCH (both significant at a 1% level; 
Appendix Tables 9 and 10, column 4). Therefore, assuming a time lag of four years, 
the further a country was behind the frontier and the larger TFPGAP, the more produc-
tive are investments in ICT. Hence, laggards in terms of low relative TFP-levels may 
benefit from using information and communication technology at least more than the 




Empirica (2021) 48:283–327 
average industry. Considering three-year lags (column 3), there are again significantly 
positive interaction terms (at the 5% level) on EFFCH. The long adoption processes 
and training requirements for realizing (relative) productivity gains may explain why 
the most noticeable effects appear only after a substantial delay. For example, introduc-
ing an Enterprise-Resource-Planning platform could be more beneficial in an industry 
where efficiency is low. The existence of ICT-induced spillovers is also supported by 
the positive coefficients (Appendix Tables 9 and 10; columns 1–5) for many of the ICT 
interaction terms (for TFPCH and EFFCH).
5  Discussion and robustness
The decomposition approach of Färe et al. (1994) and the applied DEA methodol-
ogy assume constant returns to scale. This assumption is contestable. Therefore, we 
ran experiments using probability weights for observations based on initial industry 
shares of total manufacturing from 1990 (as presented in Appendix Table 17). Such 
weighting procedures are perceived to be problematic although they were used in 
Griffith et al. (2004), Khan (2006) and Mc Morrow et al. (2010), thus the results are 
not further discussed. The differences are negligible anyway.
Whereas we allow for fixed industry effects, industries are not homogeneous. 
This limitation applies to this study as well as to its predecessors. A particular case 
is Electrical and optical equipment (30–33). From 1990 to 2006, this is the most 
dynamic manufacturing sector in terms of productivity growth (of 4.8% per year 
according to Table 4) and simultaneously the most R&D intensive one. Yet at the 
same time it exhibits the lowest average technical efficiency (θ = 0.7 in the last col-
umn of Table  4), indicating that clear catching-up patterns are missing. Actually, 
the dominant frontier countries (US and Germany, see the charts in the Appendix) 
even increase their (relative) advantage with most of the other countries over time. 
Already Mc Morrow et  al. (2010) identify this sector as the main source of the 
EU–US productivity gap. More evidence for the lack of a catching-up tendency of 
‘Electrical and optical equipment’ (and special behavior of other sectors) is shown 
in Appendix Table 18 in which the coefficients of the TFPGAP variable are insig-
nificant for TFPCH and EFFCH for the sector 30–33.
No matter how much non-frontier countries invest into R&D and whether or not 
they benefit from knowledge spillovers, backward industries do not achieve higher 
growth rates than frontier countries and are therefore not able to close productiv-
ity gaps. These findings are crucial for the negative interaction terms related with 
R&D.5 Possible reasons for the presence of widening productivity gaps are strong 
exclusiveness and concentration of knowledge or imbalances regarding human 
resources, which may characterize high-tech industries. After all and in spite of 
5 After excluding the most dynamic sector (30t33) from panel regression models, the significant impact 
of R&D only occurs for t-2 and TECHCH (it is therefore an essential cornerstone of the main results); 
after exclusion, interaction terms are insignificant, but for most models regarding TFPCH and EFFCH, 
they are at least positive.
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globalization and the view that the World is flat (© Thomas Friedman), distinct com-
parative advantages of particular industries may be local, a point made by Iversen 
and Soskice (2019). An important observation is that gaps are increasing for certain 
countries (e.g., for Italy and Spain, see Appendix) simultaneously in all manufactur-
ing industries, which runs counter to the catching-up hypothesis. However, this wid-
ening gap explains the difficulties these countries faced and still face after being hit 
hard by the financial crisis 2008 and the following Great Recession.
The role of R&D as a determinant of specific TFP levels is crucial in most pub-
lic debates but less clear empirically. Given that highly industrialized and knowl-
edge driven economies like Japan show rather low TFP levels, it is to some extent 
questionable whether TFPGAPs adequately reflect scientific absorptive capacity, or 
whether they rather refer to other structural deficits. Only Griffith et al. (2004) find 
positive and significant interactions with R&D.
Table 14 in the Appendix offers additional perspectives on the role of trade and, 
in particular, on the positive import-related interaction terms for the TECHCH 
model. These supplementary results suggest that the further a country is behind the 
frontier, the higher the share of imports. This strong relation (significant at the 1% 
level) suggests that imports are quantitatively more important in backward indus-
tries. However, higher lags render imports insignificant for all three variables, 
TFPCH, EFFCH, and TECHCH. Our explanation is that newly imported machin-
ery can be put quickly into efficient use. The importance of imports for growth can 
be seen from the extreme case of how sanctions lowered economic growth recently 
in Iran and Russia, because import substitution leads to inefficiencies (contrary to 
claims of local politicians).
Although the literature finds little justification for TFP growth being driven by 
export activities (causality seems to run rather the other way round), we included 
exports (to the world) in some regressions (see Tables 12, 13 and 14). Compared to 
imports, results are similar because both are driven by the international economic 
situation and thus correlated. However, whereas exports (as well as imports) have no 
significant stand-alone impact on TFPCH, for the case of exports a (weakly) signifi-
cant negative interaction term essentially denies a positive (general) role of exports 
in particular for laggards.
Our last test of robustness involves instrumental variable (IV) regressions (using 
higher order lags as instruments), see Tables 15, 16 and 17. This eliminates potential 
biases (including the Nickell bias) and confirms by and large the results in Tables 5, 
6 and 7 in terms of the estimated coefficients and their significance; in some cases, 
significance even increases. The coefficient of (TFPGAP × R&D)t−1 becomes signif-
icant (again positive) in explaining TECHCH suggesting that R&D might help lag-
gards disproportionally in frontier-shifting, but this effect is fragile and it even turns 
negative for a two-period lag. Like for TFPCH, the interaction (TFPGAP × R&D)t−2 
is significantly negative also for EFFCH. In particular, the coefficient of (TFP-
GAP × R&D) t−2 is significantly negative also for EFFCH; and there is again no 
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evidence that R&D activities—specifically with respect to the distance from the 
frontier—would act as catalyst for catching-up. Almost all estimates of the catchup 
term (TFPGAP) increase and thus strengthen the importance of catching up on the 
growth of total factor productivity, of efficiency, and of technological progress.
6  Conclusions
This investigation offers insights into productivity dynamics using a panel of 12 
manufacturing industries in 12 industrialized countries for 1990 to 2006. Based on 
a DEA and Malmquist-type Index approach, it does not only update Griffith et al. 
(2004) for a later period, but provides new perspectives by introducing and analyz-
ing decomposed TFP measures.
The distance to the frontier affects TFP growth in two ways. The further an indus-
try lies behind the frontier, the higher will be the TFP growth rates (TFPCH) and 
the respective component EFFCH (indicating specifically catching-up). This sup-
ports the previous findings of catching-up patterns for the extended observation 
period. By contrast, for TECHCH (which refers to innovation) we find the opposite 
relation: the bigger the TFP gaps, the smaller will be productivity growth through 
frontier-shifts. This suggests some asymmetry of development, which Acemoglu 
et al. (2017) attribute to different kinds of capitalism, and the exploration of this link 
could the subject of future research.
In line with endogenous growth theories, R&D is a source of TFP growth 
(TFPCH). While R&D affects EFFCH (for one year lagged R&D intensities), it 
especially leads to a robust upward shift of the technology frontier (TECHCH for 
two year time lags of R&D expenses). However, we cannot confirm that R&D is 
more effective the larger the TFP gap; actually the estimated coefficients of the 
related interaction terms are negative. Therefore, the role of R&D in the process of 
catching-up is confined to EFFCH.
We find no indication for a direct impact of import shares on TFP growth. Nev-
ertheless, the decomposed measures show evidence of a (at least minor) role for 
technology transfer. With respect to catching-up, imports have a moderate posi-
tive impact on EFFCH. Effects on TECHCH are ambiguous (negative for imports 
directly but positive if interacting with respect to the distance from the frontier). 
Our findings support the view that trade helps importers by accelerating technol-
ogy transfer. Increasing openness to trade could therefore present a policy option for 
making manufacturing industries more competitive in terms of productivity—recall 
the observation in Melitz and Trefler (2012) for Canada benefitting from NAFTA. 
We also find some evidence for positive effects of ICT capital on TFP convergence. 
Backward industries benefit more from investments in ICT than the average indus-
try but with a substantial delay (four-year time lag) due to the time it takes to take 
advantage of ICT technologies (Table 8).
Whereas one of our objectives was to update and to clarify issues open in Grif-
fith et al. (2004) and follow ups, new questions arise. First and presumably, the most 
important unsolved issue is to explain the large differences in TFP levels and their 
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components. Second, one would like to understand better the role of convergence. 
One way to address both questions is to broaden the set of explanatory variables, 
e.g., by including proxies for the much discussed different labor market regula-
tions and rigidities, or for differences in management practices (see Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2010)), or schooling (see Vandenbussche et al. 2006). Other directions of 
future research are to account for the large differences between sectors that were 
somewhat averaged out by the use of panel regressions and for geography, i.e., 
the hypothesis that the spillovers depend also on distances (broadly measured but 
including language, culture and politics), see e.g. Aldieri and Cincera (2009).
Table 5  Results I—total factor productivity change (TFPCH)
Dependent variable is TFPCH. Explanatory variables (time-lagged with t − 1, t − 2) are: TFPGAP (the 
distance from frontier estimated by DEA); R&D (R&D expenses/value added); M (imports from the 
world/gross output); if ICT (ICT capital/Non-ICT capital) is included on the rhs, the outlier—electri-
cal and optical equipment—is excluded from the sample. Linear panel regression with country-industry 
fixed effects and a full set of time-dummies for 11 manufacturing industries, 12 countries, 1990–2006;  R2 
within; t-**statistics in parentheses use robust clustered standard errors; statistical significance: *p < 0.1, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.145***
(5.1) (4.9) (4.4) (4.3) (5.2)
R&D i j t−1 0.00637**
(2.4)
R&D i j t−2 0.00694*** 0.00565**
(2.8) (2.0)
M i j t−1 − 0.0229 0.00726
(− 0.4) (0.1)
ICT i j t−1 0.0608
(0.3)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−1 − 0.00368**
(− 2.0)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−2 − 0.00387** − 0.00239
(− 2.0) (− 1.0)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−1 0.000936 − 0.0274
(0.0) (− 0.6)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 0.0786
(0.6)
_cons 0.824*** 0.827*** 0.865*** 0.848*** 0.818***
(25.4) (24.0) (25.1) (24.8) (21.7)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1979 1849 2244 2040 1849
R2 0.1489 0.1445 0.1477 0.1731 0.1486
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Our rather surprising finding of only highly delayed effects of ICT call for more 
research, including a differentiation of ICT capital into particular categories, which 
could be feasible with the new 2016/2017 KLEMS release. The inclusion of more 
recent data should also allow addressing how far the Great Recession affected inter-
national differences in TFP and its drivers including catching-up. However, this 
extension and its focus on potential breaks due to the events in 2008 and thereafter 
makes sense for an analysis in a separate paper in the future.
Table 6  Results II—efficiency change (EFFCH)
Dependent variable is EFFCH, as proposed by Färe et al. (1994). All other specifications as in Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.212*** 0.178*** 0.219*** 0.187*** 0.242***
(6.5) (5.5) (7.3) (6.9) (7.2)
R&D i j t−1 0.00660* 0.00292
(1.9) (0.9)
R&D i j t−2 0.000698
(0.2)
M i j t−1 0.106* 0.108*
(1.9) (1.8)
ICT i j t−1 − 0.0104
(− 0.1)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−1 − 0.00607** − 0.00228
(− 2.2) (− 0.9)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−2 − 0.00232
(− 0.9)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−1 − 0.0976** − 0.101**
(− 2.4) (− 2.2)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 0.0329
(0.2)
_cons 0.756*** 0.806*** 0.758*** 0.793*** 0.719***
(19.5) (20.2) (19.7) (23.9) (16.4)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1979 1849 2244 2040 1979
R2 0.1335 0.1336 0.1321 0.1255 0.1418
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Table 7  Results III—technological changes (TECHCH)
Dependent variable is TECHCH, as proposed by Färe et al. (1994). All other specifications as in Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 − 0.0741*** − 0.0401* − 0.0969*** − 0.0662*** − 0.0770***
(− 3.3) (− 2.0) (− 4.9) (− 3.3) (− 4.1)
R&D i j t−1 − 0.000450
(− 0.1)
R&D i j t−2 0.00599** 0.00798***
(2.2) (3.4)
M i j t−1 − 0.129*** − 0.120***
(− 3.6) (− 2.7)
ICT i j t−1 0.135
(1.1)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−1 0.00266
(1.3)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−2 − 0.00137 − 0.00372***
(− 0.9) (− 2.6)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−1 0.100*** 0.0937***
(4.8) (3.3)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 − 0.00536
(− 0.1)
_cons 1.061*** 1.015*** 1.101*** 1.044*** 1.067***
(41.6) (41.0) (42.7) (43.2) (43.0)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1979 1849 2244 2040 1849
R2 0.3213 0.3238 0.3245 0.3152 0.3301
Table 8  Comparing how different factors affect TFP growth and its components
± Indicating positive/negative significant coefficients (at least at the 10% level); 0 representing insignifi-
cance; Time lags are (t—1); for R&D intensities they are presented for both: (t—1) and (t—2)
Griffith et al. (2004) TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH
This paper
Catching up + + + –
R&D +/+ +/+ +/0 0/+
Trade (import share, M) 0 0 + –
ICT 0 0 0
Interactions
 R&D +/+ − /− − /0 0/0
 Trade: imports + 0 – +
 ICT 0 0 0
 Sample period 1974–1990 1990–2006
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Appendix 1: Complementary Statistical Analyses
See Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
Table 9  A long-run perspective on ICT (I)
ICT is the ratio ICT-capital/Non-ICT capital; Observations of 30–33 (‘Electrical and optical equipment’; 
ICT producers excluded; all other specifications equal to regressions in Table 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.110*** 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.125*** 0.157***
(4.3) (4.4) (5.1) (5.5) (5.6)
ICT i j t−1 0.0608
(0.3)
ICT i j t−2 0.170
(0.7)
ICT i j t−3 − 0.0523
(− 0.3)
ICT i j t−4 − 0.538***
(− 3.3)
ICT i j t−5 0.00457
(0.0)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 0.0786
(0.6)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−2 − 0.0363
(− 0.2)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−3 0.0378
(0.3)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−4 0.425***
(3.7)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−5 0.0503
(0.3)
_cons 0.848*** 0.825*** 0.822*** 0.854*** 0.867***
(24.8) (22.0) (24.5) (34.7) (28.4)
Country-industry fixed effects 
and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2040 1920 1800 1680 1560
R2 0.1731 0.1633 0.1521 0.1550 0.1501
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Table 10  A long-run perspective on ICT (II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.187*** 0.180*** 0.198*** 0.186*** 0.222***
(6.9) (6.3) (7.0) (7.1) (7.8)
ICT i j t−1 − 0.0104
(− 0.1)
ICT i j t−2 − 0.195
(− 0.7)
ICT i j t−3 − 0.420**
(− 2.4)
ICT i j t−4 − 0.615***
(− 3.3)
ICT i j t−5 − 0.198
(− 0.7)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 0.0329
(0.2)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−2 0.165
(0.8)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−3 0.272**
(2.1)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−4 0.455***
(3.6)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−5 0.181
(0.9)
_cons 0.793*** 0.793*** 0.796*** 0.802*** 0.753***
(23.9) (22.4) (24.1) (26.6) (21.5)
Country− industry fixed 
effects and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2040 1920 1800 1680 1560
R2 0.1255 0.1274 0.1387 0.1307 0.1346
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Table 11  A long− run perspective on ICT (III)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 − 0.0662*** − 0.0466*** − 0.0417** − 0.0588*** − 0.0668***
(− 3.3) (− 3.3) (− 2.6) (− 3.9) (− 4.3)
ICT i j t−1 0.135
(1.1)
ICT i j t−2 0.385***
(3.6)
ICT i j t−3 0.412***
(4.1)
ICT i j t−4 0.122
(0.8)
ICT i j t−5 0.233
(1.4)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 − 0.00536
(− 0.1)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−2 − 0.219**
(− 2.5)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−3 − 0.272***
(− 3.9)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−4 − 0.0691
(− 0.7)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−5 − 0.154
(− 1.4)
_cons 1.044*** 1.029*** 1.022*** 1.050*** 1.115***
(43.2) (55.8) (50.9) (54.3) (55.7)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2040 1920 1800 1680 1560
R2 0.3152 0.3161 0.3024 0.2646 0.2332
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Table 12  Additional tests (I)—more lags
Variable Trade corresponding to imports plus exports normalized by gross output; X is representing 
exports (to the world) normalized by gross output. All other specifications equal to regressions in Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.124*** 0.136*** 0.126*** 0.137*** 0.120***
(5.0) (5.6) (5.7) (4.7) (4.3)
Trade i j t−1 0.00670
(0.2)
X i j t−1 0.0617
(1.2)
M i j t−2 − 0.00728
(− 0.1)
R&D i j t−3 0.00318
(1.0)
R&D i j t−4 0.00395
(1.0)
(TFPGAP × Trade) i j t−1 − 0.0114
(− 0.6)
(TFPGAP × X) i j t−1 − 0.0525*
(− 1.7)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−2 − 0.0176
(− 0.5)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−3 − 0.00135
(− 0.6)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−4 − 0.00205
(− 0.7)
_cons 0.850*** 0.831*** 0.854*** 0.836*** 0.861***
(25.1) (25.2) (30.1) (25.1) (25.1)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2244 2244 2112 1719 1589
R2 0.1475 0.1480 0.1457 0.1497 0.1361
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Table 13  Additional tests (II)—more lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.193*** 0.183*** 0.154***
(7.8) (7.8) (7.2) (5.0) (4.5)
Trade i j t−1 0.0655***
(2.7)
X i j t−1 0.148***
(3.4)
M i j t−2 0.0260
(0.5)
R&D i j t−3 − 0.00124
(− 0.3)
R&D i j t−4 0.000199
(0.1)
(TFPGAP × Trade) i j t−1 − 0.0590***
(− 3.4)
(TFPGAP × X) i j t−1 − 0.130***
(− 4.3)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−2 − 0.0531
(− 1.4)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−3 − 0.000510
(− 0.2)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−4 − 0.000123
(− 0.0)
_cons 0.751*** 0.751*** 0.791*** 0.823*** 0.836***
(20.2) (20.8) (22.5) (19.1) (20.4)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2244 2244 2112 1719 1589
R2 0.1333 0.1332 0.1319 0.1432 0.1096
308 Empirica (2021) 48:283–327
1 3
Table 14  Additional tests (III)—more lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 − 0.0932*** − 0.0805*** − 0.0598*** − 0.0391* − 0.0292
(− 4.5) (− 3.8) (− 3.1) (− 1.9) (− 1.2)
Trade i j t−1 − 0.0596***
(− 3.1)
X i j t−1 − 0.0897**
(− 2.4)
M i j t−2 − 0.0285
(− 0.9)
R&D i j t−3 0.00420*
(1.7)
R&D i j t−4 0.00373
(1.5)
(TFPGAP × Trade) i j t−1 0.0490***
(4.4)
(TFPGAP × X) i j t−1 0.0817***
(3.6)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−2 0.0339*
(1.8)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−3 − 0.000783
(− 0.5)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−4 − 0.00203
(− 1.3)
_cons 1.094*** 1.075*** 1.055*** 1.008*** 1.021***
(40.1) (39.2) (41.2) (38.9) (35.8)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2244 2244 2112 1719 1589
R2 0.3234 0.3216 0.3165 0.3043 0.2679
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Table 15  Total factor productivity change (TFPCH)—instrumental variable regression
IV regression with fixed effects and t-dummies; endogenous variable is TFPGAP(t- 1) and instrumental 
variable is TFPGAP(t- 2), other explanatory variables of each model are exogenous; dependent variable 
is TFPCH;  R2 within; t-statistics in parentheses, statistical significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t TFPCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.106*** 0.0917*** 0.155***
(5.0) (5.3) (3.9) (3.0) (4.8)
R&D i j t−1 0.00699**
(2.5)
R&D i j t−2 0.00777*** 0.00597**
(3.0) (2.3)
M i j t−1 − 0.0333 0.0164
(− 0.8) (0.3)
ICT i j t−1 − 0.0882
(− 0.4)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−1 − 0.00418**
(− 2.2)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−2 − 0.00450** − 0.00258
(− 2.5) (− 1.4)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−1 0.0105 − 0.0341
(0.4) (− 1.0)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 0.209
(1.3)
_cons 0.811*** 0.810*** 0.875*** 0.865*** 0.805***
(22.7) (23.9) (25.3) (23.5) (19.0)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1885 1849 2112 1920 1849
R2 0.1422 0.1443 0.1428 0.1729 0.1486
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Table 16  Efficiency change (EFFCH)—instrumental variable regression
IV regression; dependent variable is EFFCH—all other specifications as in Table 15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t EFFCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 0.254*** 0.232*** 0.251*** 0.198*** 0.293***
(8.5) (8.1) (9.0) (6.3) (8.6)
R&D i j t−1 0.00854*** 0.00411
(3.0) (1.4)
R&D i j t−2 0.00389
(1.4)
M i j t−1 0.123*** 0.141***
(2.8) (2.7)
ICT i j t−1 − 0.0428
(− 0.2)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−1 − 0.00789*** − 0.00330
(− 4.0) (− 1.6)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−2 − 0.00475**
(− 2.5)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−1 − 0.112*** − 0.125***
(− 3.8) (− 3.4)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 0.0655
(0.4)
_cons 0.711*** 0.741*** 0.710*** 0.768*** 0.660***
(19.2) (20.9) (19.8) (20.2) (14.7)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1885 1849 2112 1920 1885
R2 0.1345 0.1304 0.1299 0.1276 0.1419
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Table 17  Technological changes (TECHCH)—instrumental variable regression
IV regression; dependent variable is TECHCH—all other specifications as in Table 15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t TECHCHi j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 − 0.108*** − 0.0832*** − 0.144*** − 0.0996*** − 0.117***
(− 4.7) (− 3.8) (− 6.7) (− 4.3) (− 4.6)
R&D i j t−1 − 0.00224
(− 1.0)
R&D i j t−2 0.00344* 0.00669***
(1.7) (3.3)
M i j t−1 − 0.165*** − 0.157***
(− 4.8) (− 3.9)
ICT i j t−1 − 0.000559
(− 0.0)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−1 0.00430***
(2.8)
(TFPGAP × R&D) i j t−2 0.000574 − 0.00296**
(0.4) (− 2.0)
(TFPGAP × M) i j t−1 0.129*** 0.120***
(5.7) (4.3)
(TFPGAP × ICT) i j t−1 0.108
(0.9)
_cons 1.100*** 1.067*** 1.164*** 1.090*** 1.118***
(38.6) (39.5) (42.4) (39.1) (33.2)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1885 1849 2112 1920 1849
R2 0.3174 0.3212 0.3216 0.3182 0.3283
Table 18  Industry heterogeneity (in terms of Catching-Up)
TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH
Food, beverages and tobacco (15–16) 0.0588** 0.0957** − 0.0328
Textiles, textile, leather and footwear (17–19) 0.1353** 0.0754 0.0572
Wood and of wood and cork (20) 0.2176** 0.2635*** − 0.0166
Pulp, paper, paper products (21–22) 0.0929 0.1291** − 0.0314
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel (23–25) 0.1273* 0.1853*** − 0.0524***
Other non-metallic mineral (26) 0.2261** 0.2797*** − 0.0520*
Basic metals and fabricated metal (27–28) 0.2154*** 0.2013*** 0.0157
Machinery, nec (29) 0.1051 0.1602 − 0.0510**
Electrical and optical equipment (30–33) 0.0006 0.0473 − 0.0232*
Transport equipment (34–35) 0.1789*** 0.1816*** − 0.0037
Manufacturing nec; recycling (36–37) 0.2200*** 0.2156*** 0.0065
All observations 0.1074*** 0.1516*** − 0.0355*
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Table 19  R&D, M & ICT 
regressed on TFPGAP
R&D i j t M i j t ICT i j t
TFPGAP i j t−1 − 0.168 0.355*** 0.0732*
(− 0.1) (2.6) (1.8)
_cons 4.704*** − 0.0265 0.0131
(2.9) (− 0.2) (0.3)
Country-industry fixed 
effects and time dummies
Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2015 2244 2244
R2 0.0734 0.2619 0.0698
Table 20  Industry-shares and TFPCH/KLEMS correlations
Columns 1 and 2 reflect the average industry size as share of total manufacturing for 1990 and 2006; 
ρ is the correlation coefficient of the internal KLEMS TFP growth estimate derived from TFPva_I and 
TFPCH as derived by Malmquist Index
Share_90 Share_06 ρ
12.84 10.57 0.912 Food, beverages and tobacco (15–16)
6.44 3.17 0.884 Textiles, textile, leather and footwear (17–19)
2.54 2.07 0.937 Wood and of wood and cork (20)
11.24 8.97 0.901 Pulp, paper, paper products (21–22)
14.94 17.07 0.912 Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel (23–25)
4.84 4.07 0.875 Other non-metallic mineral (26)
13.74 12.57 0.915 Basic metals and fabricated metal (27–28)
10.44 9.77 0.940 Machinery, nec (29)
10.14 19.57 0.836 Electrical and optical equipment (30–33)
8.34 8.67 0.904 Transport equipment (34–35)
4.54 3.47 0.931 Manufacturing nec; recycling (36–37)
100 100 0.875 All observations
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Appendix 2: Estimated TFP‑Levels; 1989–20066
See Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 2  Austria
6 Derived by CCR DEA. 1 = indicates the frontier.
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 3  Belgium
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 4  Denmark
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 5  Finland
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 
 









































































Fig. 6  France
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 7  Germany
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 8  Italy
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 9  Japan
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 10  Netherlands
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 11  Spain
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 12  United Kingdom
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D: Total manufacturing 15t16: Food, etc. 17t19: Texles 
20: Wood 21t22: Pulp, Paper, etc. 23t25: Chemical, etc. 
26: Non-metallic Minerals 27t28: Basic metals 29: Machinery n.e.c. 









































































Fig. 13  United States of America
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